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COMMENTS
UNITED STATES v. GEORGESCU:
SPECIAL AIRCRAFT JURISDICTION IN
THE UNITED STATES
I. INTRODUCTION
The question of who should have jurisdiction over the pros-
ecution of crimes committed on board aircraft in flight has been
answered in a variety of confusing and disparate forms. Tradi-
tional bases of jurisdiction under international law are helpful
tools to answer the question when the prosecuting state has a
traditional recognizable local or national interest in the assertion
of criminal jurisdiction.1 In the case of aircraft in international
flight, the question is more difficult to answer because the justi-
fication for prosecution does not always fit the form of a tradi-
tional national interest. Prosecuting crimes committed on board
a foreign aircraft in international flight may require a nation to
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over the crime.2 Further-
1. A brief explanation of the traditional bases of jurisdiction is provided as an intro-
duction. The territorial theory allows for jurisdiction over offenses committed within a
state's territory. The nationality theory grants jurisdiction based upon the nationality of
the offender. The protective theory recognizes jurisdiction over offenses affecting a
state's sovereign interests. The passive personality theory extends jurisdiction to the
state of nationality of the victim of the offense. The universal theory allows jurisdiction
over particular universally recognized crimes to any nation. Another basis of jurisdiction
is the place of landing theory which grants jurisdiction to the nations from which the
aircraft either departed or landed with the offender on board the aircraft. The aircraft's
state of registration provides one other basis for jurisdiction. For a more detailed expla-
nation of the traditional bases of jurisdiction in international law, see infra notes 13-26
and accompanying text (Section II).
2. Consider the example of a United States citizen who poisons a British citizen
while both are on board an Air India flight from Rome to Copenhagen. It is unknown
exactly where the poison was administered, or where the British citizen died. If the
United States, England, or India chose to asserf jurisdiction over the offense, this would
be an example of a state's exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction since the crime did not
occur over any of the states' territorial airspace. Allan Mendelsohn, In-Flight Crime: The
International and Domestic Picture under the Tokyo Convention, 53 VA. L. Rav. 509
(1967) [hereinafter Mendelsohn].
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more, there is often more than one interested state which could
assert jurisdiction. It is most difficult to determine which state
should prosecute.
Congress extended traditional United States jurisdiction in
1970 when it created "special aircraft jurisdiction" for the fed-
eral courts over certain criminal acts.' The need for such a broad
scope of jurisdiction developed because of the growing number
of crimes committed on board aircraft as international air travel
increased.4 This jurisdiction extends beyond previously accepted
jurisdictional boundaries prescribed by the principles of interna-
tional law. The United States special aircraft jurisdiction incor-
porates the territorial theory of jurisdiction with the place of
landing theory.' Under the special aircraft jurisdiction statute, a
United States federal court may exercise jurisdiction over cer-
tain crimes committed on board any aircraft which lands at its
scheduled destination, or had its last point of departure, within
the United States." Therefore, this includes jurisdiction over
crimes occurring on any aircraft over any part of land or sea,
regardless of the nationality of the victim or offender if the air-
craft departed from or lands in the United States.
3. 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1991). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(38) The term "special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States" includes -
(d) any other aircraft outside the United States -
(i) that has its next scheduled destination or last point of departure in the
United States, if that aircraft next actually lands in the United States;
(ii) having "an offense," as defined in the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, committed aboard, if that aircraft lands in the
United States with the alleged offender still aboard; or;
(iii) regarding which an offense as defined in subsection (d) or (e) of article 1,
section 1 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal, September 23, 1971) is committed if the
aircraft lands in the United States with an alleged offender still on board[.]
Id.
49 U.S.C. § 1472(k)(1) (1991) provides:
Whoever, while aboard an aircraft within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the
United States, commits an act which, if committed within the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, as defined in section 7 of Title
18, would be in violation of section 113, 114, 661, 662, 1111, 1112, 1113, chapter
109A, or 2111 of such Title 18 shall be punished as provided therein.
4. See Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 532.
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
403 reporter's note 9 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] suggests that special air-
craft jurisdiction is based upon either the effects principle or universal jurisdiction. The
effects principle incorporates activity outside a state but which has a substantial effect
within the state. It is considered an extension of the territorial theory. Id. at § 402 cmt.
d.
6. See infra note 9.
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United States v. Georgescu7 is the first case to use this spe-
cial aircraft jurisdiction to prosecute a foreign national for a
criminal act against another foreign national while on board a
foreign aircraft which landed in the United States.8 A Romanian
defendant was indicted for sexual abuse and attempted sexual
abuse of a nine-year-old Norwegian girl while on board a Scandi-
navian Airlines aircraft which landed in New York.9 Although
the United States exercise of jurisdiction over this crime was
correctly held by the United States District Court for the East-
ern District to be in accord with international law and consistent
with congressional authorization, 0 the wisdom of such prosecu-
tion is unfounded."
This Comment begins by analyzing the origin of special air-
craft jurisdiction based upon international law and United
States legislative authority. This Comment then questions the
propriety of such an exercise of jurisdiction in light of the for-
eign policy ramifications and potential effects upon our judicial
system. This Comment then suggests and discusses solutions to
potential problems arising out of prosecutions like Georgescu,
including a set of formal guidelines for the federal prosecutors,
the use of extradition, and a written certification process.
7. United States v. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. 912 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
8. Judge Weinstein stated it was a "case of first impression" in Georgescu, id. at
913. For examples of other United States courts' application of special aircraft jurisdic-
tion to materially different situations, see infra note 82.
9. The statute provides in part:
(c) Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States or in a Federal prison, knowingly engages in a sexual act with another
person who has not attained the age of 12 years, or attempts to do so, shall be
fined under this title, imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2241 (1991).
"Sexual act" is defined as:
(c) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another by
a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.
18 U.S.C. § 2245 (1991).
Defendant ultimately pled to abusive sexual contact, 18 U.S.C. § 2244 (1991). Interview
with Linda B. Lakhdir, Assistant United States Attorney, in Brooklyn, N.Y. (Oct. 31,
1990) [hereinafter Interview].
10. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. at 912.
11. Judge Weinstein also had reservations about the prosecution, "[d]espite this
court's reservations about the wisdom of further prosecution in this country, it lacks the
power to refuse jurisdiction on equitable grounds." Id. at 922.
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIAL AIRCRAFT JURISDICTION
Which state should have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes
committed on board aircraft in international flight? An answer
could be based upon one of several factors, among them: the lo-
cation of the aircraft at the time when the crime was committed;
the nationality of the accused or the victim; the nation in which
the aircraft is registered; and the nation in which the plane
originated or landed. There is rarely one state with exclusive ju-
risdiction. Instead, international law is premised on the idea of
concurrent, or shared, bases of jurisdiction. 2 With shared juris-
diction, however, comes the problem of deciding whether a par-
ticular state should assert jurisdiction over a particular offense.
The answer to the question of which state should exercise juris-
diction requires an analysis of traditional bases of jurisdiction,
as well as an examination of the policy issues at stake with each
choice.
A. Traditional Bases of International Jurisdiction
There are five widely accepted bases of jurisdiction under
international law."3 As defined in the frequently cited Harvard
Research in International Law in 1935,1" they are: (1) the terri-
torial theory which allows for jurisdiction over acts committed
within a nation's territorial boundaries; 15 (2) the nationality the-
12. In 1927, the Permanent Court of International Justice, an international tribunal
established by the League of Nations, explicitly affirmed the idea of concurrent jurisdic-
tion in the S.S. "Lotus" decision when it stated that:
Neither the exclusive jurisdiction of either State, nor the limitations of the
jurisdiction of each to the occurrences which took place on the respective ships
would appear calculated to satisfy the requirements of justice and effectively to
protect the interests of the two States. It is only natural that each should be
able to exercise jurisdiction and to do in respect of the incident as a whole. It is
therefore a case of concurrent jurisdiction.
S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser A) No. 10, reprinted in BURNS H. WESTON,
ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER; A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 82
(2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter WESTON].
13. United States courts have accepted these five traditional bases. See, e.g., United
States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 899-900 (D.D.C. 1988) (five traditional bases of juris-
diction under international law); Laker Airlines v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731
F.2d 909, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (customary bases of jurisdiction include territoriality and
nationality); United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1979) (United
States can have jurisdiction over criminal acts under the protective or objective territori-
ality theory).
14. Research in International Law of the Harvard Law School, Jurisdiction with
Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 445 (Supp. 1935).
15. The territorial theory is the most widely accepted basis for the exercise of juris-
[Vol. XVIII'l228
1992] UNITED STATES v. GEORGESCU 229
ory which grants jurisdiction based upon the nationality of the
offender; 16 (3) the protective theory which encompasses extrater-
ritorial acts which threaten a nation's security or basic govern-
mental function;17 (4) the passive personality theory which al-
lows the exercise of jurisdiction when the victim is a citizen of
the state;' s and (5) the universal theory which is based upon the
concept that every nation has jurisdiction over certain crimes
deemed to be of universal concern. 9
Historically, international jurisdiction over crimes has cen-
tered upon the territorial theory.20 The emphasis of the nation-
state in political theory encouraged the acceptance of territorial
boundaries as a basis for jurisdictional authority.2 1 A nation's
diction. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, at § 402 cmt. c. Criminal law is generally
based upon the premise of a state's need to keep the peace within its own territory and
exert control over law enforcement.
16. The nationality theory is the other principal basis for jurisdiction because it in-
volves the powers of a state to prescribe law with respect to its nationals outside, as well
as within, the state's territory. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, at ch. 1, 237.
17. The protective theory recognizes the right of a state to punish a limited number
of offenses committed outside the state's territory but which are directed solely against
the state and threaten to impair the integrity of government functions. Such offenses
include espionage, violation of immigration or customs law, falsification of official docu-
ments, or counterfeiting the state's seal or currency. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5,
at § 402 cmt. f.
18. This theory, historically less widely supported in the United States, allows a
state to assert jurisdiction over offenses committed against its own nationals. RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD), supra note 5, at § 402 cmt. g, reporter's note 3. This theory, while an
inverse of the nationality theory, tends to be more controversial because of its impact on
the sovereignty of other states. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, at ch. 1, 273.
19. The universal theory recognizes that international law permits any state to ap-
ply its laws and assert jurisdiction over the offender of universal crimes regardless of any
links of territory or nationality which the state has with the crime and the offender.
Crimes of universal concern include piracy, slave trade, genocide, and war crimes. RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, at § 404; see also Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Ju-
risdiction Under International Law, 66 TEx. L. REV. 785 (1988) [hereinafter Randall].
20. See, e.g., Christopher L. Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction Over Extraterri-
torial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1114-23 (1982) [hereinafter Blakesley].
Chief Justice Marshall stated what is considered a classic formulation of the United
States territorial theory:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive
and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any re-
striction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a dim-
inution of its sovereignty . . . to the same extent in that power which would
impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore . . . must be traced up to the
consent of the nation itself.
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
21. Note, Constructing the State Extraterritorially: Jurisdictional Discourse, the
National Interest, and Transnational Norms, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1273, 1276 (1990)
[hereinafter Note, Constructing the State].
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boundaries define the political and legal powers of the state. It is
both appropriate and necessary that a state establish a penal
code for itself and the power to prosecute violations of its penal
laws. The effects principle, which is part of the territorial theory,
includes activity which occurs outside the state's territorial
boundaries, but which has, or is intended to have, a substantial
effect within the state.22
The other traditional bases of jurisdiction are extensions of
the territorial theory. The protective theory, for example, incor-
porates the concept that conduct which occurs outside a nation
can have the same effects upon that nation as conduct within
the nation's territory. Thus, prosecution of certain extraterrito-
rial crimes is necessary to protect a nation's security and govern-
mental functions within its territory. The passive personality
theory, while generally less accepted than other bases of jurisdic-
tion, is sometimes used in connection with certain criminal
laws. 23 The theory that a nation should have jurisdiction over a
criminal act committed against one of its nationals makes sense
if considered within the scope of a nation's territorial authority.
An analogy could be made that a citizen outside his or her own
nation carries jurisdictional authority in the same way a flagship
of the nation does. 24 The nationality theory, which is less contro-
versial than the passive personality theory, operates on the same
principle that a nation has an interest in jurisdiction over crimes
committed by its nationals as an extension of territorial
22. The territorial theory includes extraterritorially committed crime based upon a
crime's subjective or objective effects within the state. If a constituent element of the
crime was committed within the United States, jurisdiction typically can be exerted.
This theory is called the subjective territoriality theory. The objective territoriality the-
ory, on the other hand, allows a state to exert jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct
which causes effects within the state's territorial boundaries. Blakesley, supra note 20, at
1118-23.
23. The United States enacted the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism
Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2331, which relies upon the passive personality theory. Patrick
L. Donnelly, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Acts of Terrorism Committed
Abroad: Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 599 (1987). The act expands United States extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign
nationals engaging in international terrorism that injures a United States citizen. Only
those offenses intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against the United States are
included in the act. Id. at 606-08; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, at § 402
reporter's note 3.
24. A state may regulate activity on board vessels or aircraft registered in that state
and foreign vessels within the state's territorial waters or airspace. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 5, at § 402 cmt. h, reporter's note 4.
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authority.25
These theories provide a state with extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion in certain traditional situations. 6 The problem, however,
with regulating conduct on board aircraft is that while a state
may have jurisdiction over the offense committed on board, that
state typically may choose not to assert jurisdiction because it
may lack any genuine interest in the prosecution of the crime.
The more significant issue is which state should have priority
when there is concurrent jurisdiction. There is no traditional an-
swer in international law to this question.
B. Theories of Aircraft Jurisdiction
Various theories of aircraft jurisdiction have been in exis-
tence since 1902.27 They evolved from the traditional bases of
international jurisdiction. The "state of registration" theory
grew from the accepted "law of the flag" theory for maritime
vessels.2s The state of registration theory allows a nation to exer-
cise jurisdiction over activity occurring upon its own vessels or
aircraft.29 Problems with this theory are that other nations
might have greater interests affected by the conduct.30 A second
theory also follows the territorial principles of international law,
that is, whichever state in whose air'space the offense occurred
has jurisdiction over such offense. Clearly this poses the some-
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, at § 402 reporter's note 1.
26. The United States Supreme Court first held that there was no constitutional bar
to the extraterritorial application of United States penal laws in United States v. Bow-
man, 260 U.S. 94 (1922). But the extraterritorial jurisdictional reach of a nation is, in
fact, never entirely free from controversy. While the principle of a nation regulating con-
duct outside its territory is generally accepted, it is the length of the jurisdictional reach
and the nature of the offense covered by the reach which provokes controversy. The
International Bar Association Conference in 1989 focused on widespread concern regard-
ing the rapidly expanding scope of international jurisdiction over product and environ-
mental liabilities. IBA On Product/Environmental Liability, WORLD Loss REPORT, Oct.
20, 1989. Meanwhile, the debate over the extraterritorial application of United States
law in the economic sphere, like the antitrust and securities areas, has also grown unpro-
ductive. See Spencer W. Waller, Bringing Meaning to Interest Balancing in Transna-
tional Litigation, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 925 (1991).
27. NICHOLAS M. MATTE, TREATISE ON AIR-AERONAUTICAL LAW 329-30,- nn. 12-13
(1981) [hereinafter MATTE].
28. The United States Supreme Court recognized the international acceptance of
the law of the flag theory in United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1937).
29. Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 513.
30. Another problem is that a passenger choosing an airline typically selects a par-
ticular airline because of price, seat availability, time of departure, or other such practi-
cal reasons, none of which relate to a selection of a state's laws and procedures. Mendel-
sohn, supra note 2, at 513.
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times impossible dilemma of determining where the offense oc-
curred."' A third theory, called the "place of landing" theory,
gives jurisdiction to the state in which the aircraft lands after an
offense is committed.32 Again, other states might have greater
interests than the state of first landing.3 3 The fourth theory is a
combination of the three theories, called the "mixed" theory,
which incorporates their strengths and avoids their weak-
nesses.3 4 The mixed theory grants multiple and concurrent juris-
diction to all of the states directly affected and includes the na-
tionality of the offender.3 5
United States special aircraft jurisdiction is based on the
place of landing theory and grants the United States jurisdiction
when any aircraft departs from or lands in the United States.
The principles of international law support this creation of a
special aircraft jurisdiction. The Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States explicitly states that
the United States assertion of special aircraft jurisdiction would
not be unreasonable in light of a combination of the effects prin-
ciple and the universal principle s.3  The Restatement, however,
limits its approval of special aircraft jurisdiction to prosecutions
of serious crimes of force.3 7
31. Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 514.
32. Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 514.
33. One other disadvantage with this theory is that the place of landing might be
selected on an emergency basis, or a stop where the offender had never intended to dis-
embark, therefore the offender potentially had no notice of the possibility of being sub-
ject to that state's laws. Nevertheless, this theory has significant advantages from a pro-
cedural view point because the evidence, witnesses, victim, and offender are all present.
Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 514.
34. Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 514.
35. Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 514. This mixed theory is what the international
community has accepted through international conventions and treaties.
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, at § 403 reporter's note 9.
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, at § 403 reporter's note 9:
"Special maritime" and "special aircraft" jurisdiction of the United States.
. . . Such jurisdiction could reach offenses that do not involve acts in United
States territory or airspace, acts by United States nationals, or acts aboard a
United States registered vessel or aircraft - for instance, a hijacking over the
high seas by a national of State X of an aircraft of State Y bound for the
United States. Whether such jurisdiction is based on the effects principle, §
402(1)(c), or a kind of universal jurisdiction, § 404, exercise of criminal juris-
diction in these circumstances would not seem unreasonable under Subsection
(2) [§ 403], especially in the case of a serious offense, for example one involving
the use of force.
Note that the crimes included in the special aircraft jurisdiction are all crimes of force.
See infra note 84.
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C. The Path of Special Aircraft Jurisdiction
1. International Conventions on Aircraft Jurisdiction
The international community has endorsed a method of
prosecuting offenders under municipal criminal laws extended
by different nations to criminal acts committed on board aircraft
in international flight.38 Through international conventions and
multilateral and bilateral treaties, nations are extending their
municipal criminal codes to aircraft in international flight.3e An-
other method of prosecuting offenders of aircraft crime would be
to establish an international criminal code and an international
forum in which to enforce and prosecute international crimes.
While this proposal arouses much intellectual discourse, it re-
ceives little actual support from nations.4 0 It generally cannot be
considered a viable option in the near future.4
The Tokyo Convention (Convention), held in 1963, is the
origin of the United States special aircraft jurisdiction, as well as
the starting point for the international community's acceptance
of special aircraft jurisdiction.42 The Convention's principal ob-
jective was the maintenance of safety and good order on board
38. MATTE, supra note 27, at 331-32.
39. See Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Tokyo Convention],
reprinted in Louis HENKIN, ET. AL., BASIC DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO "INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS" 296 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter HENKIN]; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 10 I.L.M. 133,
reprinted in HENKIN, supra, at 303; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 10 I.L.M.
1151, reprinted in HENKIN, supra, at 308. The numerous extradition treaties between
countries are evidence of the acceptability of municipal law as applied to an interna-
tional situation. E.g., Valery Shupilov, Legal Assistance in Criminal Cases and Some
Important Questions of Jurisdiction, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 127 (1983).
40. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional Inter-
national Criminal Law, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 27 (1983) [hereinafter Bassiouni];
Daniel H. Derby, An Analytic Framework for International Criminal Law: Realism and
Interest Realignment, 1 TOURO L. REV. 57 (1985); Robert A. Friedlander, The Founda-
tions of International Criminal Law: A Present-Day Inquiry, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 13 (1983) [hereinafter Friedlander].
41. See Bassiouni, supra note 40, at 34, 37.
42. Tokyo Convention, supra note 39. Drafting of the treaty began in 1950 when the
Legal Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) first consid-
ered the legal status of aircraft. Six years later the first draft was written in Geneva.
After several revisions, the fourteenth session of the ICAO took place August 28-Septem-
ber 15, 1962 in Rome. The final version was amended and ratified August-September
1963. MATTE, supra note 27, at 334. Norway and Romania were both parties to the To-
kyo Convention. HENKIN, supra note 39, at 296.
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aircraft.43 The international community recognized the interna-
tional implications of increasing aircraft crime and the resulting
conflicts of jurisdiction.4
The Convention applies to all offenses against penal law and
other acts which may not be penal offenses but jeopardize the
safety, good order, and discipline on board an aircraft.4" Debate
at the Convention focused on whether such offenses and acts
would include those which did not actually threaten the safety
of the aircraft itself. 46 The delegates decided that those acts
would be covered by the three categories created at the Conven-
tion. The first category includes those that threaten the safety of
the aircraft; the second, those that jeopardize the good order and
discipline on board; and the third, the most significant of all,
those offenses which violate penal law.47
The jurisdiction established and approved at the Conven-
tion incorporates the historical proposals of aircraft jurisdic-
tion"' and traditional jurisdictional bases in international law. 49
The Convention authorizes jurisdiction to the state of registra-
tion of the aircraft.5 More significantly, though, it permits the
43. MATTE, supra note 27, at 337.
44. PSTER B. KEENAN, ET AL., SHAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT ON AIR LAW 701-02 (3d ed.
1966) [hereinafter KEENAN].
45. Tokyo Convention, supra note 39. Article 1 provides:
1. This Convention shall apply in respect of:
a) offences against penal law;
b) acts which, whether or not they are offences, may or do jeopardize the safety
of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or which jeopardize good order
and discipline on board.
46. The United States representative was reluctant to endorse such a potentially
broad scope. Nevertheless, his colleagues were not, and the Convention voted down pro-
posals to narrow the scope to offenses threatening aircraft safety or to serious offenses. 1
International Civil Aviation Organization, International Conference on Air Law, Tokyo,
August-September 1963; KEENAN, supra note 44, at 702-03.
47. Tokyo Convention, supra note 39, at art. 1. This third category encompasses
offenses which do not threaten safety or good order on board the aircraft and would
include the crime of sexual abuse. See Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 521.
48. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 13-25 and accompanying text.
50. Tokyo Convention, supra note 39. Article 3 provides:
1) The State of registration of the aircraft is competent to exercise jurisdiction
over offences and acts committed on board.
2) Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction as the State of registration over offences committed on
board aircraft registered in such State.
3) This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in ac-
cordance with national law.
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exercise of any jurisdiction as authorized by national law.5 The
next issue is which state, if any, has priority to assert jurisdic-
tion, given the authorization of potentially concurrent and over-
lapping jurisdiction. The Convention did not resolve this issue,52
nor has any later convention prioritized interested states'
jurisdiction. 3
Two later conventions, the Hague Convention in 1970 and
the Montreal Convention in 1971, concerning offenses commit-
ted on board aircraft, did not change the types of offenses cov-
ered by or the jurisdiction authorized by the Tokyo Conven-
tion. 4 Instead, the later conventions narrowed their focus to the
rapidly growing international problems of terrorist and hijacking
crimes on board aircraft.55 These conventions were never in-
tended to supersede any previous treaties and, instead, built
upon the principles established by the Tokyo Convention. 6
2. United States Legislative Authority for Aircraft
Jurisdiction
The United States Congress first addressed the issue of air-
craft jurisdiction in 1952 when it amended the "Special Mari-
time and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States" to in-
clude aircraft belonging to the United States.57 Such jurisdiction
was too limited,5 s however, and Congress in 1961 created extra-
51. See supra note 50.
52. KEENAN, supra note 44, at 704; Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 516-17.
53. One author has argued that the Tokyo Convention sanctioned a de facto system
of priority in favor of the state in which the offender is apprehended since no other
interested state has priority over the state of landing. Abraham Abramovsky, Multilat-
eral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference with Air-
craft. Part 1: The Hague Convention, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381, 396 (1974).
54. MATTE, supra note 27, at 370-71.
55. Because of the narrowing focus, defendant incorrectly argued that the Tokyo
Convention itself applied only to terrorist and hijacking crimes. Defendant's Memoran-
dum on Motion to Dismiss at 8, United States v. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. 912 (E.D.N.Y.
1989) (89 CR 258). For discussion of defendant's arguments, see infra notes 71-74 and
accompanying text (Section III A).
56. The world's attention was increasingly focused on terrorism and hijacking be-
cause of the grave difficulties involved in cooperation with other nations in the capture
and prosecution of terrorists. See MATrE, supra note 27, at 371.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 7(5) (1991). The statute previously covered only maritime vessels.
But when United States v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950), held that United
States aircraft were not considered vessels within the meaning of the statute, Congress
added what is now paragraph 5 of section 7 in order to include United States aircraft
within United States jurisdiction over crimes occurring over the high seas. See Mendel-
sohn, supra note 2, at 530-31.
58. Jurisdiction was allowed only when the offense was out of any particular state's
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territorial jurisdiction over certain crimes committed on board
aircraft in air commerce.5 9 The bill was drafted mainly for ter-
rorist and hijacking crimes, but other serious crimes were in-
cluded. 0 Therefore, from its inception, special aircraft jurisdic-
tion was not created solely for the purpose of prosecuting
terrorists and hijackers. It is also clear that Congress was amply
aware of the broad reach of the legislation, but recognized the
need for federal coverage of crimes on board all aircraft in order
to contribute to the administration of justice and the promotion
of air commerce. 1
The legislative definition of air commerce did not encom-
pass the full jurisdiction permitted under the Tokyo Conven-
tion.2 Thus, the 1970 legislation enacted to implement the
United States ratification of the Tokyo Convention replaced air
commerce with the jurisdictional definition of "special aircraft
jurisdiction. 6 This path of legislative history illustrates con-
gressional intent to assert jurisdiction over foreign aircraft which
may have no other connection with the United States except by
jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 7(1) (1991).
59. Congress amended the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 in 1961. Federal Aviation
Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-197, 75 Stat. 466 (1961). The primary purpose
of the amendments was to extend federal criminal laws to acts committed on board air-
craft. Congress specifically included foreign aircraft in air commerce which originated or
landed in the United States:
The language of this legislation, coupled with the definition of "air commerce"
in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, will operate to make certain of its provi-
sions applicable not only to acts committed on American-flag aircraft in flight
in air commerce over foreign countries but also to such acts committed on for-
eign aircraft in flight in air commerce over foreign countries, but only if such
aircraft are engaged in flights originating, at or destined to points in the United
States . . . The committee feels that it is necessary and appropriate for the
legislation to have this broad coverage if it is to operate as an effective deter-
rent to crime and promote safety in air commerce.
H.R. REP. No. 958, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
60. Crimes included were aircraft piracy, assault, maiming, embezzlement and theft,
murder, manslaughter, attempt to commit murder or manslaughter, rape, carnal knowl-
edge of females under the age of 16, robbery and burglary, indecent exposure, carrying
weapons on board, and imparting or conveying false information. H.R. REP. No. 958,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
61. Id. at 2564-65.
62. Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 538.
63. H.R. REP. No. 91-1535, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Special aircraft jurisdiction
of the United States included the following aircraft while in flight -
(c) any other aircraft (i) within the United States or (ii) outside the United
States which has its next scheduled destination or last point of departure in
the United States provided that in either cases it next actually lands there.
H.R. No. 91-1535.
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place of landing, as well as congressional intent to cover crimes
unrelated to the safety of the aircraft. 4
III. UNITED STATES V. GEORGESCU
A. Facts and Procedural History
On March 25, 1989, a nine-year-old Norwegian girl was sex-
ually abused by Victor Georgescu, a Romanian citizen, while
watching the in-flight movie on board a Scandinavian Airlines
aircraft from Oslo, Norway to New York City. 5 The girl and her
family boarded Scandinavian Airlines Flight 911 in Oslo, Nor-
way as did the defendant Georgescu 6 During the flight, the girl
was seated next to Georgescu so that she would have a better
view of the in-flight movie. 7 As the airplane flew over the Atlan-
tic Ocean, Georgescu sexually abused the girl by placing his
hand beneath her underwear on her genitals.6 When the air-
plane landed at John F. Kennedy International Airport in
Queens, New York, Georgescu was arrested and subsequently in-
dicted for engaging and attempting to engage in a sexual act
with a child not yet twelve years of age, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c) 9 while aboard an aircraft within the special aircraft
jurisdiction of the United States.70
Georgescu moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of juris-
diction."' He asserted that the United States did not have juris-
diction to prosecute a Romanian citizen for an alleged assault on
64. One author has argued that there has been insufficient attention to the constitu-
tional authority of recent extraterritorial United States law enforcement. Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, 83
Am. J. INT'L L. 880 (1989). Nevertheless, the author did not question the constitutional-
ity of special aircraft jurisdiction, so long as United States jurisdiction which is based on
the presence of the accused is directly related to the offense charged. Id. at 893.
65. Government's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at
3, United States v. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. 912 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (89 CR 258).
66. Prior to moving to Norway with her Norwegian mother and her American step-
father, the girl had lived in the United States for several years. The girl holds a United
States green card which allows her legal residency in the United States. Id. Georgescu is
a radio navigator for TAROM, the state-owned airline of Romania. Id.
67. Id.
68. The girl ran back to her mother after the assault hysterically crying. The par-
ents complained to the flight attendants who told the captain of the aircraft. The captain
notified Kennedy Airport. Both Port Authority Police and agents from the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation were at Kennedy Airport when the airplane landed. Interview,
supra note 9.
69. See supra note 9.
70. See supra note 3.
71. Defendant's Memorandum at 1, Georgescu (89 CR 258).
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a non-United States citizen on board a foreign aircraft while
over non-United States territory.72 Georgescu argued that the
special aircraft jurisdiction statute did not cover the alleged
crime of sexual abuse by a foreigner of another foreigner on
board a foreign aircraft over foreign airspace. 73 He further ar-
gued that established principles of international law denied the
United States jurisdiction over this crime.
In response, the federal prosecutor from the United States
Attorney's office of the Eastern District of New York argued
that jurisdiction was properly asserted under the special aircraft
jurisdiction statute.7" The prosecutor maintained that the legis-
lative history of the special aircraft jurisdiction statute confirms
congressional intent to include a variety of crimes which occur
on board foreign aircraft.1 The prosecutor also argued that the
principles of international law supported United States assertion
of jurisdiction in this case.77
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York denied defendant's motion for dismissal of the indict-
ment for lack of jurisdiction. 78 Defendant filed an interlocutory
appeal which was dismissed due to a lack of subject matter juris-
diction to hear the appeal.79 In July 1990, defendant Georgescu
72. Id. at 2.
73. In a convoluted argument of statutory construction, defendant attempted to ar-
gue that the statute's authorization of jurisdiction required that the crime was addition-
ally an offense as defined by the Hague or Montreal Conventions, which would therefore
preclude the charged crime since the Hague and Montreal Conventions addressed only
terrorist and hijacking crimes. Id. at 7-9.
74. Defendant argued first that the flagship, or aircraft in this case, had exclusive
jurisdiction over conduct occurring on the high seas or airways. Second, defendant ar-
gued that the foreign country had not consented to United States criminal jurisdiction
over crimes on board aircraft. Third, since there were no demonstrable effects or nexus
between the crime and the United States, there was no constitutional justification for
jurisdiction over the crime. Id. at 10-12.
75. The Assistant United States Attorney argued that the plain meaning of 49
U.S.C. § 1301(d)(i) clearly covers the alleged crime. Defendant's grammatical construc-
tion of the statute was incorrect because the crime need not be one covered by the To-
kyo, Hague, or Montreal Conventions as specified in subsections (ii) and (iii). Govern-
ment's Memorandum at 10, Georgescu (89 CR 258).
76. The Assistant United States Attorney demonstrated that Congress intended to
preserve, generally, the safety and security of the aircraft and all those aboard it. Id. at
11.
77. Id.
78. United States v. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. 912 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
79. Interview, supra note 9. Appeals to federal courts of appeals from United States
district courts must be from final decisions of district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1991).
Therefore, since the jurisdictional decision was a non-final judgment, the court of ap-
peals had no basis for a determination.
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entered a plea of nolo contendere8 0 Georgescu was sentenced to
approximately five hundred hours of community service to be
served in Romania.8
B. The Court's Decision
The court declared the application of special aircraft juris-
diction to the indictment to be a case of first impression.s2 The
court correctly held that the United States assertion of jurisdic-
tion was proper because the sexual abuse was committed within
the special aircraft jurisdiction created by Congress. 3 The court
found that Congress had intended to criminalize, and give fed-
eral courts jurisdiction over, certain specified acts committed
within this special aircraft jurisdiction. ' The court found that
the creation of the special aircraft jurisdiction was constitutional
and within congressional power."5 Moreover, such an assertion of
jurisdiction did not violate international law. 6
The court's opinion focused on the legislative history of the
statute by examining preceding United States statutes governing
aircraft crime. The court found that the legislative record of ear-
lier aircraft jurisdiction statutes indicated congressional intent
80. Interview, supra note 9. This type of plea may be entered by leave of the court
to a criminal indictment. With this plea, defendant has not admitted or denied the crim-
inal charges, he has simply not contested them.
81. Interview, supra note 9.
82. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. at 913. Special aircraft jurisdiction has been used many
times in the United States, but never with similar facts. See generally United States v.
Clark, 893 F.2d 1277 (11th Cir. 1990) (attempted murder on flight from Panama to New
York); United States v. Cortijo-Diaz, 875 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1989) (assaulting and intimi-
dating a stewardess on a flight from New York to Puerto Rico); United States v. Meeker,
527 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1975) (intimidating pilot and passengers on board a flight from
Miami to San Francisco); United States v. Anderson, 503 F.2d 420 (6th Cir. 1974) (at-
tempted manslaughter on flight from Pennsylvania to Ohio).
83. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. at 914. Cf. Chumney v. Nixon, 615 F.2d 389, 391 (6th
Cir. 1980) (the court interpreting a civil case found that, "Congress ... has undertaken
to apply federal law to American (and other) aircraft while such aircraft are . . . re-
turning from a foreign country directly to an airport in the United States").
84. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. at 914-18. Crimes currently enumerated in 49 U.S.C. §
1472(k)(1) include the following sections from Title 18 of the United States Code: 113
(assault within maritime and territorial jurisdiction); 114 (maiming); 661 (steal or pur-
loin personal property of another); 662 (receiving stolen property); 1111 (murder); 1112
(manslaughter); 1113 (attempt to commit murder or manslaughter); 2111 (robbery and
burglary); and chapter 109A, which includes sections 2241 (aggravated sexual abuse),
2242 (sexual abuse), 2243 (sexual abuse of a minor or ward), and 2244 (abusive sexual
conduct).
85. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. at 918.
86. Id. at 919-21.
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
to cover acts committed on foreign aircraft.87 It was also clear to
the court that the jurisdiction also encompassed crimes not re-
lating to hijacking crimes.88 Judge Weinstein stated that:
The history of the statutes regarding crimes committed aboard
aircraft makes plain the congressional design to criminalize
and create jurisdiction over specified acts committed in non-
United States airspace aboard foreign carriers bound for and
landing in the United States, including aggravated sexual
abuse.. . 9
The court rejected defendant's argument that special aircraft ju-
risdiction applies only to offenses covered by the Hague and
Montreal Conventions committed on board foreign aircraft.90
The court found that international law placed no restriction
upon such an exercise of jurisdiction.9 1 The Tokyo Convention
approved of criminal jurisdiction which was exercised in accor-
dance with national law.2 The special aircraft jurisdiction was,
after all, specifically created in order to comply with the Tokyo
Convention.9" The court stated that "the Tokyo Convention's
primary goal was to encourage nations to exercise jurisdiction
over [aircraft] crimes."9
The court also rejected defendant's suggestion that the spe-
cial aircraft jurisdiction was unconstitutional. 5 The court stated
that there were ample constitutional bases for the exercise of
this jurisdiction, including the Commerce Clause and the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause to enforce United States treaty
obligations.9
87. See supra note 83.
88. See supra note 84.
89. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. at 914-15.
90. Judge Weinstein stated that, "[tihere is nothing in the legislative history to indi-
cate that Congress meant to qualify the broad jurisdiction over crimes aboard foreign
aircraft that it conferred in the 1961 and 1970 criminal provisions." Id. at 917.
91. Id. at 919-20. 1
92. See supra note 50.
93. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. at 919.
94. Id. at 920.
95. Id. at 918.
96. Id. Judge Weinstein stated that the Commerce Clause, Section 8 of Article 1,
allowed Congress to regulate commerce and that maintaining safety and security on
board aircraft encourages air commerce between the United States and other nations. He
cited the Necessary and Proper Clause, Section 8 of Article 1, which grants Congress the
authority to make laws necessary to enforce and implement United States treaty obliga-
tions with other nations. Additionally, Congress has the authority to, "define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed upon the High Seas, and Offences against the Law of
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IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE GEORGESCU DECISION
In United States v. Georgescu,97 the United States was in
the unusual position of prosecuting a foreigner for a crime he
committed against another foreigner on board a foreign aircraft
while flying over the Atlantic Ocean. 8 This was a case of first
impression, even for the Eastern District of New York in which
John F. Kennedy International Airport is located.99 The author-
ity of the court to uphold the special aircraft jurisdiction has
been shown. 100 Nevertheless, if Georgescu signals a trend toward
future prosecutions of crimes in similar situations, there remain
some fundamental problems with the continued exercise of such
jurisdiction.
A. Burdensome Duty on the United States Federal Courts
System
The most practical effect of the broad jurisdiction granted
by Congress to the federal courts could prove to be the burden-
some duty on the federal system, including both the courts and
the prosecutors. While the number of cases with foreign ele-
ments similar to Georgescu is apparently small, the time spent
on these cases with such international ramifications is considera-
bly more than on a "typical" case. Here, a prosecutor from the
United States Attorney's office had to interview the passengers
and crew, which, due to the international nature of the flight,
involved people from all over the world. Moreover, the burden
on the victim and potential witnesses is significantly increased
because of the need to travel internationally in order to tes-
tify.101 Problems with finding, gathering, and introducing evi-
Nations," from Article 1, Section 8, Clause 10. Jurisdiction over the "high airways" cer-
tainly is analogous to the "high seas." Id. at 918-19.
97. Id. at 912.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 913. It is surprising that since 1970, when special aircraft jurisdiction was
first conceived, there have been no other cases in the United States with similar foreign
players and circumstances. In an interview, the Assistant United States Attorney who
handled the case stated that these types of cases rarely went as far as this case did,
implying that alternative solutions are available for handling crimes with such jurisdic-
tional conflicts. Interview, supra note 9.
100. See supra notes 12-96 and accompanying text (Sections II and III).
101. In fact, in this case, the victim and her family were initially willing to help in
the prosecution of the defendant. However, as time dragged on in the case, and as trial
approached, the family became less interested in cooperating. A plea was acceptable to
the Assistant United States Attorney partly because of the family's growing reluctance.
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dence are multiplied when dealing with foreigners and other na-
tions.102  The United States Department of State, the
Department of Justice's Office of International Affairs, as well as
the Romanian and Norwegian officials all had to be consulted
immediately in this case.10 3 These factors, considered with the
circumstances of the crime, will not always justify the United
States prosecution when the United States interests are as mini-
mal as they are in this case. 104
If the actual logistics are not that serious, the theoretical
burden is more troubling. It is questionable if the federal gov-
ernment should spend its valuable, and limited, time and re-
sources on the prosecution of crimes when there are several
other potential and justifiable locations for prosecution. 06 It also
is not clear where the offender would serve his or her sen-
tence. 0 These are some of the issues which must be resolved if
Georgescu is a sign of further prosecutions using special aircraft
jurisdiction in similar contexts.
B. Damaging Effects on United States Relations with Other
Nations
The United States must also concern itself with the effects
of the assertion of special aircraft jurisdiction upon its relations
with other nations.107 When the United States applies its laws
extraterritorially, asserting criminal jurisdiction over extraterri-
torial conduct, other nations' interests are frequently affected
and offended, and conflicts often arise. 08 The traditional bases
Interview, supra note 9.
102. While foreign documents and evidence are covered by Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, the gathering, certification, and introduction of such evidence entails a
more detailed authentication process than for United States evidence. See 18 U.S.C. §§
3491-94, 3505-07 (1991).
103. Interview, supra note 9.
104. The decision to prosecute any case always entails a discretionary choice, but it
seems obvious that the facts of this case were more compelling to the prosecutor than if,
for example, the victim had "only" been robbed.
105. But see infra notes 120 & 127.
106. Georgescu spent 24 days in a United States jail awaiting bail and received a
three year sentence from Judge Weinstein. The sentence was suspended except for the
24 days in jail, and, instead, Georgescu was given 500 hours of community service to be
done in Romania. Interview, supra note 9.
107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, at ch. 1, 236 (discussion of United States
overreach of extraterritorial jurisdiction).
108. In this case, Romania strongly opposed United States jurisdiction and asserted
the innocence of Georgescu. Relationships with Romania were already politically
strained at the time of the incident. Interview, supra note 9.
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of jurisdiction rely upon the territorial theory. Thus, a state's
competence to prescribe laws is inextricably attached to a state's
sovereignty. Such a relationship between a state's sovereignty
and its prescriptive competence encourages jurisdictional con-
flict in the area of prosecuting international crime. In most in-
stances, like Georgescu, when there are several possible bases of
jurisdiction and locations of prosecution, several different states'
sovereign interests are affected. The lack of any precise prioritiz-
ing of states' jurisdictional interests only adds to the tangle of
sovereignty, jurisdiction, and prosecution.
The application of United States law abroad has already
caused considerable controversy.10 9 While such extraterritorial
reach may have legislative and constitutional authority, the for-
eign policy implications are considerable and far from settled.
The United States Congress created special aircraft jurisdiction
over certain particular crimes" 0 without sufficient attention to
our national interest, or lack of it, in the prosecution of these
crimes. Such a wide scope of jurisdiction might be considered
yet another example of a form of American imperialism, despite
the open door to jurisdiction resulting from the Tokyo
Convention."'
One other serious concern is the potential prosecution of
United States citizens abroad for criminal conduct under a simi-
lar jurisdictional authority." '2 The potential prosecution of our
109. See Increased Use of Extraterritoriality Could Threaten International Busi-
ness, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1334, at 532 (Oct. 1, 1987) (noting in-
creased frequency and intensity of conflicts of international jurisdiction in international
business); IBA on Product/Environmental Liability, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 20, 1989
(focusing on expanding liabilities in product and environmental litigation and problems
with international jurisdiction and procedure); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, at
ch. 1, 282-303 (controversy concerning economic regulatory laws of the United States).
110. See supra note 84 for current list.
111. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 280-81 (1990) (Justice Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan wrote:
Particularly in the past decade, our Government has sought, successfully, to
hold foreign nationals criminally liable under federal laws for conduct commit-
ted entirely beyond the territorial limits of the United States that nevertheless
has effects in this country. Foreign nationals must now take care not to violate
our drug laws, our antitrust laws, our securities laws, and a host of other fed-
eral criminal statutes. The enormous expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction
outside our Nation's boundaries has led one commentator to suggest that our
country's three biggest exports are now "rock music, blue jeans, and United
States law." (citation omitted)
Id.
112. Note, Constructing the State, supra note 21, at 1277.
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citizens under a foreign penal code merely because of a foreign
aircraft's place of landing is unsettling. While the crimes within
the United States special aircraft jurisdiction are malum in se,
there is no guarantee that other states will act in the same way.
C. The Internationalization of Municipal Law
The invocation of special aircraft jurisdiction in Georgescu
is an example of the internationalization of municipal law. One
commentator has theorized that international criminal law is the
product of two legal disciplines: "the criminal aspects of interna-
tional law and the international aspects of national criminal
law." 113 The difference between the two disciplines is significant.
Combatting international crimes like terrorism and hijacking,
essentially those of the first legal discipline, was the impetus for
the various treaties under which special aircraft jurisdiction was
invoked. But these treaties also include those crimes of the sec-
ond legal discipline.
A fundamental problem with internationalizing municipal
law is that the world as a whole has not recognized all crimes in
the same manner.' 4 Proof of this lack of unity is the very lim-
ited theoretical framework for the universal theory of jurisdic-
tion. 1 5 Therefore, if the practice of prescribing municipal laws
internationally were to continue along the same path as the
United States special aircraft jurisdiction, there might be a great
potential for conflict among foreign nations.
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE GEORGESCU
DECISION
The United States and other nations have significant con-
cerns about the promotion of safety and good order on board
aircraft and the prosecution of offenders of dangerous acts. In
order to facilitate these goals of prosecuting aircraft crime, the
international community agreed upon a wide scope of jurisdic-
tion. But such a broad authorization of jurisdiction has led to
the recurring problem of which nation should assert jurisdiction
over the crime. In order to properly answer that question, the
Assistant United States Attorney must weigh United States in-
113. Bassiouni, supra note 40, at 27.
114. Friedlander, supra note 40, at 24.
115. Only a limited number of crimes are universally condemned. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 5, at § 404; see also Randall, supra note 19.
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terests against those of other concerned nations. The Georgescu
decision is problematic because it fails to present a clear assess-
ment of United States interests in prosecuting the crime." 6
A. The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion and Suggested
Guidelines
Prosecutorial discretion plays a central role in the enforce-
ment of justice and such discretion cannot be abrogated. But the
Department of Justice should establish for the United States At-
torney's office a formal method of assessing United States inter-
ests when considering prosecution of a crime under the special
aircraft jurisdiction which has no connection to this country ex-
cept for the statute's jurisdiction. The significant foreign policy
implications warrant more careful guidance.
There are presently no applicable formal, written guidelines
issued by the Department of Justice or the Department of State
for a situation like that in Georgescu."7 In Georgescu, the deci-
sion was made in conjunction with the Department of State and
the Department of Justice's Office of International Affairs, but
earlier decisions are always made before such consultative advice
can be obtained." 8 Written guidelines would aid the prosecutor
in the early decision making process of whether to go forward
with a case.
Suggested guidelines for an Assistant United States Attor-
ney are in the form of a series of questions."19 The answers to
the questions provide a framework for the prosecutor to evaluate
whether the United States jurisdiction is justified in each partic-
116. Judge Weinstein, while upholding the special aircraft jurisdiction statute, ques-
tioned, "the wisdom of further prosecution in this country . . " United States v. Ge-
orgescu, 723 F. Supp. 912, 922 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
117. Here, the Assistant United States Attorney on call on March 25, 1989, re-
sponded to the authorities at Kennedy Airport in a routine manner. The decision to go
forward with the indictment and prosecution, however, was made in consultation with
the new Assistant United States Attorney (Lakhdir) assigned the case, the Chief of Gen-
eral Crimes in the Eastern District, the Department of State, and the Department of
Justice's Office of International Affairs. These offices were involved in the case from the
start, and it is doubtful whether the case would have gone forward without Washington's
approval. Interview, supra note 9.
118. Interview, supra note 9.
119. The Department of Justice has guidelines for international antitrust enforce-
ment. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations (Nov. 10, 1988), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) para. 13, 109.
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ular case. 2 '
1. Using the principles of international law and interna-
tional treaties, what other states could assert jurisdiction over
the offense? Are those states interested in investigating the of-
fense and prosecuting the alleged offender?
2. Are there states which oppose United States jurisdiction
over the offense? Would those opposing states satisfactorily in-
vestigate the offense and prosecute the offender?
3. What is the United States interest in prosecuting the of-
fense? Is the United States interest based upon a belief that no
other state will conduct an equitable investigation?
4. Would a conflict occur with another state if the United
States claims jurisdiction over the offense? Is the conflict based
upon legitimate reasons which the United States would assert if
the situation were reversed? What would be the effect on the
political and economic relations between the United States and
the opposing state?
5. Is the offense a crime in the other interested or opposing
states? Is it an extraditable offense under current extradition
treaties between the United States and the other state?
6. Was the offense committed against an individual or a
group of people? Did the offense significantly disrupt the order
on board or the safety of the aircraft?
Finally, after using the suggested guidelines, the prosecutor
should consider the variety of factors suggested by the Restate-
ment (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
that limit a state's prescriptive jurisdiction. 121 The Restatement
120. While recognizing the importance of United States jurisdiction in situations
like Georgescu in order to detain the alleged offender, gather evidence, and take witness
statements, the decision to prosecute is another important step, one which the suggested
guidelines are intended to aid.
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, at § 403:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a
state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or
activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such juris-
diction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasona-
ble is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where
appropriate:
(a) the line of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has sub-
stantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for
the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
[Vol. XVIII'I246
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correctly suggests that the ultimate limitation upon interna-
tional jurisdiction to prescribe law, and prosecute, should be the
reasonableness of the jurisdiction. 122
B. Extradition as an Alternative to Prosecution
The interrelation between the role of prosecutorial discre-
tion and extradition provides an important solution to the po-
tential effects resulting from prosecutions in line with Ge-
orgescu. Legal assistance between nations, like extradition, plays
a vital role in the enforcement of international law.123 Extradi-
tion is the process by which a person charged with or convicted
of a crime against the laws of one state and found in another
state is returned to the former state by the latter state. Interna-
tional law does not obligate one state to extradite an individual
in the absence of a treaty; and in the United States, extradition
is governed by federal law. 24 Extradition depends upon jurisdic-
tional theories because generally one state will not extradite an
individual unless that state recognizes the basis for jurisdiction
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regu-
lation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate
such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regula-
tion is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or
hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal,
or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise
jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states
are in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the
other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant fac-
tors, Subsection (2); a state should defer to the other state if that state's inter-
est is clearly greater.
Id.
122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, at § 403 cmt. a.
123. International criminal law depends upon "indirect enforcement," such as extra-
dition, as its enforcement system due to the failure of the international community to
establish any "direct enforcement" system like an international criminal court. Bas-
siouni, supra note 40, at 33 n.21.
124. Louis HENKIN, ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 885-86 (2d
ed. 1987).
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asserted by the requesting state.125 Thus, the international com-
munity's acceptance of special aircraft jurisdiction is
significant.12 6
Extradition is a proper alternative because it is the ultimate
accommodation of the requesting state's interests. By definition,
the prosecutor, by beginning the process of extradition, has as-
sessed the United States interests in the prosecution of the
crime and compared them with the requesting state's
interests.127
C. Written Certification by the Attorney General for
Prosecution
One additional solution is to require written certification of
prosecution from the Attorney General. 28 Such a requirement
would best ensure that the foreign policy ramifications have
been thoroughly considered. Such a certification by the Attorney
125. This concept has been called the "special use" of "double criminality." Christo-
pher L. Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction Over Ex-
traterritorial Crimes, 4 UTAH L. REv. 685, 743 (1984) (hereinafter Blakesley, Conceptual
Framework]. The double criminality principle is that the offense charged must be an
offense in both the requesting state as well as in the requested state. Other requirements
might be that the offense have a minimum term of one year in both countries. WESTON,
supra note 12. The special use principle requires reciprocity of the jurisdictional basis in
addition to the offense. Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework, supra, at 743-44.
126. See supra notes 12-26 and accompanying text (Section II A).
127. Here, the United States was in the position of prosecuting the case because no
other state would. Apparently Norway had no interest in seeking the extradition of Ge-
orgescu. Interview, supra note 9. A sexual offense upon a minor is an extraditable offense
according to the United States extradition treaty with Norway. Extradition Treaty, June
9, 1977, U.S.-Nor. 31 U.S.T. 5621, 5634. An agreement with Romania was unacceptable
to the prosecutor because of that country's steadfast belief in Georgescu's innocence.
Interview, supra note 9. Additionally, the extradition treaty between the United States
and Romania includes only "carnal knowledge of children under the age of twelve years"
as an extraditable offense, which would probably not include the offense in question.
Extradition Treaty, July 23, 1924, U.S.-Rum. 44 Stat. 2020; Supplementary Extradition
Treaty, November 10, 1936, U.S.-Rum. 50 Stat. 1349. Therefore, since extradition was
not a realistic alternative here, the prosecutor felt compelled to proceed with the prose-
cution. Interview, supra note 9.
128. The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 has such a
requirement. 18 U.S.C. section 2332 (1991):
(d) LIMITATION ON PROSECUTION - No prosecution for any offense described in
this section shall be undertaken by the United States except on written certifi-
cation of the Attorney General or the highest ranking subordinate of the Attor-
ney General with responsibility for criminal prosecutions that, in the judgment
of the certifying official, such offense was intended to coerce, intimidate, or
retaliate against a government of a civilian population.
Id. For discussion of this act, see supra note 23.
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General would necessarily result from discussions and meetings
with representatives from all interested states. As this Comment
has demonstrated, special aircraft jurisdiction has too many in-
ternational implications for it to be asserted without due weight
given to each respective states' concerns. It may be in the
United States best interests to have the Attorney General, who
has the knowledge and power to assess United States interests
and other states' interests, make the ultimate decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
Special aircraft jurisdiction represents a strong United
States interest in the prosecution of crimes committed on board
aircraft, regardless of the nationality of the victim, the offender,
or the aircraft. The maintenance of good order and safety on
board all aircraft is a compelling interest. But because of the
number of other states' entitled to exercise jurisdiction, conflicts
over United States exercise of jurisdiction will continue to occur.
The Department of Justice has failed to establish a frame-
work for its prosecutors in which to clearly analyze United
States interests in the prosecution of a particular crime in rela-
tion with other states' interests in prosecution. The result is that
United States relations with other nations are unnecessarily
harmed. Moreover, the increased burden on the federal system
is not justified if United States interests are not substantial. The
solutions proposed would provide some help in what will always
be a murky situation. Jurisdiction cannot be forced upon any
nation, but neither can jurisdiction be too quickly asserted.
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